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however, that the decision will not be the 
last word on either of these topics.
Background
there are many exceptions to the usual 
three-year statute of limitations on 
assessments. One is section 6501(e)(1)
Tax Court Invalidates New 
Section 6501(e) Regulations
By Steve r. Johnson*
The title of an article of mine in the Fall 2009 issue of the NewsQuarterly asked “what’s Next in the Section 6501(e) Overstated Basis Controversy?” the tax Court 
answered that question on May 6, 2010, in its decision Intermountain Insurance 
Service of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 134 t.C. No. 11. In that decision, the court 
invalidated two temporary regulations that had been issued on September 24, 2009: 
sections 301.6229(c)(2)-It and 301.6501(e)-It. 
* e.l. wiegand Professor of law and associate Dean for Faculty Development and research, william S. Boyd School of law, 
university of Nevada, las vegas, las vegas, Nv.
the tax Court was unanimous in its 
result, but seriously divided as to the 
reasons for the result. the Intermountain 
decision is important as to both the 
six-year statute of limitations on 
assessment and the validity of tax 
regulations generally. It is certain, 
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(a)(i), which gives the Service six years 
to assess income tax liabilities “[i]f the 
taxpayer omits from gross income an 
amount properly includible therein 
[which] is in excess of 25% of the 
amount of gross income stated in the 
return.” Section 6229(c)(2) provides a 
similar exception for cases governed by 
the teFra partnership audit and 
litigation rules.
these exceptions undoubtedly apply 
when the taxpayer omits enough taxable 
receipts, but it has been controversial 
whether they apply when the understate-
ment arises instead from overstated 
basis of sold assets. as detailed in the 
Fall 2009 article, the case law on the 
section 6501(e) overstated basis issue is 
divided, but the Service suffered a string 
of defeats in 2009 cases.
to reverse its fortunes, treasury 
issued the September 24 regulations in 
both temporary and proposed form. 
aggressively, the temporary regulations 
were declared to apply to tax years still 
open to assessment on the date of 
issuance, with the intention that they 
apply to all pending cases, including 
those which taxpayers had won but in 
which the decisions had not yet become 
final. See t.D. 9466, 2009-43 I.r.B. 
551. Both the new regulations and their 
effective date have been highly contro-
versial from their inception.
Intermountain
Intermountain involves what the Service 
considers to be an abusive tax shelter 
involving overstated basis. Having failed 
to act within the normal three years, the 
Service relied on the six-year limitations 
period. less than a month before 
issuance of the temporary regulations, 
the tax Court had decided the statute of 
limitations issue in Intermountain’s favor. 
t.C. Memo. 2009-195. Based on the 
new regulations, the Service filed 
motions to vacate and for reconsideration 
of that decision.
By 13 to 0, the tax Court held against 
the Service, but the 13 judges fell into 
three camps. Seven judges, in an 
opinion written by Judge wherry, 
explored the possibility that, as actually 
drafted, the effective date provision did 
not effectuate treasury’s intention to 
reach not-yet-final cases. although 
advancing a questionable “plain 
meaning” analysis, the majority chose 
not to rest the decision on that ground.
Instead, the majority examined the 
substantive validity of the temporary 
regulations. assuming arguendo that 
Chevron provides the governing stan-
dard, the majority concluded that the 
regulations did not pass muster under 
Chevron Step One or Brand X. See 
National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Services, 545 u.S. 
967, 982 (2005); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
u.S. 837 (1984). Specifically, the 
majority concluded that the Supreme 
Court’s Colony decision a half century 
ago had held that what is now section 
6501(e) unambiguously precludes the 
position taken in the temporary regula-
tions. Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 
u.S. 28 (1958). the majority also noted, 
but felt it unnecessary to rule on, the 
taxpayer’s argument that the temporary 
regulations have impermissibly retroac-
tive effect.
Four other judges concurred in an 
opinion penned by Judge Cohen. this 
concurrence would have resolved the 
case on narrower grounds. Motions such 
as the Service’s typically are granted only 
in unusual circumstances. an interven-
ing statutory change can be such a 
circumstance. Alioto v. Commissioner, 
t.C. Memo. 2008-185, vacating t.C. 
Memo. 2006-199. the concurrence 
would have held, however, that an 
intervening regulatory change does not 
rise to the same level, thus is insufficient 
to warrant vacating or reconsidering.
Judges Halpern and Holmes con-
curred in another opinion. these judges 
rejected the majority’s effective date and 
Chevron analyses but saw the temporary 
regulations as invalid on procedural 
grounds. the administrative Procedure 
act (“aPa”) applies to rulemaking by 
federal agencies, including the treasury 
Department. See 5 u.S.C. § 551(1). 
unless a stated exception applies, 
regulations are validly promulgated only 
if they go through the notice-and-com-
ment process prescribed by 5 u.S.C. 
§ 553. the temporary regulations were 
not promulgated through this process. 
Nonetheless, the Service defended their 
validity on two grounds: that the 
regulations fall within the aPa exception 
for merely interpretive rules and that 
Congress implicitly excepted temporary 
tax regulations from the notice-and-
comment requirement. the Halpern/
Holmes concurrence rejected both 
contentions, and thus would hold the 
regulations to be procedurally invalid 
under the aPa.
Evaluation
all three opinions in Intermountain 
reflected distaste for what the judges 
viewed as overly zealous use of the 
regulations process. the Service saw the 
Intermountain tax shelter as abusive. It is 
worth remembering that not just 
taxpayers, but the Service, too, can 
commit tax abuse. 
although motivated by a common 
impulse, the tax Court judges differed 
greatly as to the doctrine by which to 
make that impulse legally operative. In 
my view, Judges Halpern and Holmes 
had the best view of the case. the 
omission of notice-and-comment is not 
justified by either of the grounds asserted 
by the Service.
the Service’s “merely interpretive” 
argument is hopeless. the temporary 
regulations at issue were promulgated 
under the general authority of section 
7805(a), not specific authority within 
sections 6501 or 6229. the Service and 
tax lawyers as a whole have long called 
general-authority regulations “interpre-
tive” and specific-authority regulations 
“legislative.” It is high time that we broke 
ourselves of that bad habit. “Interpretive” 
and “legislative” regulations have well 
understood meanings in administrative 
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law—meanings which have nothing to 
do with the general-authority versus 
specific-authority distinction. Instead, 
legislative regulations have “force of law” 
character—they make binding law or 
change the law—while interpretive 
regulations merely explain the agency’s 
view of the statute. E.g., Chrysler Corp. 
v. Brown, 441 u.S. 281, 301-02 (1979). 
tax regulations that make binding law 
are legislative whether they are promul-
gated under specific authority or general 
authority. the temporary regulations at 
issue clearly are legislative; their point 
was not to explain the Service’s view of 
section 6501 but to change the law by 
administratively reversing the law as 
articulated by the adverse cases.
the Service’s argument that Congress 
excepted temporary tax regulations from 
aPa notice-and-comment is better but 
probably not good enough. the argu-
ment is based on inference, not explicit 
text. yet Congress has provided that 
other statutes may modify aPa require-
ments only expressly, not impliedly. 5 
u.S.C. § 559.
the arguments advanced in the other 
Intermountain opinions do not strike me as 
persuasive. First, as pointed out by Judges 
Halpern and Holmes, the regulations’ 
effective date provision is ambiguous, not 
plain. the provision might be read to mean 
“open under the normal three-year period,” 
as the Intermountain majority read it, or it 
might mean “open under the six-year 
period, as that period is extended by this 
regulation,” as treasury and the Service 
intended. an agency’s construction of its 
own ambiguous regulation is entitled to 
deference. E.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 u.S. 
452, 461 (1997); Stinson v. United 
States, 508 u.S. 36, 44-46 (1993).
Second, the majority likely is wrong as 
to its Chevron Step One analysis. Colony 
itself did not say that its result was 
unambiguously commanded by the 
statute. Moreover, Colony construed a 
predecessor of current section 6501(e), 
and the current statute arguably is 
somewhat more congenial to the Service’s 
position. Finally, as noted in the Fall 
2009 article, the Service won a number 
of the cases after Colony but before 
2009. there are two possibilities. either 
the courts holding for the Service failed to 
notice that Colony had settled the issue, 
or the Intermountain majority overplayed 
its hand in characterizing Colony’s 
holding. I think that the second of these 
alternatives better states the matter.
third, the narrow ground offered by 
Judge Cohen and the judges joining her 
is dubious. yes, a statute outranks a 
regulation. But a validly promulgated 
legislative regulation has force of law 
status. thus, the distinction offered by 




































the tax Court’s Intermountain decision 
surely is not the last shot that will be 
fired in the overstated basis statute of 
limitations battle. the Government may 
appeal Intermountain, and the validity 
and applicability of the new regulations 
will surely be tested in other cases in 
the future.
Based on the above analysis, the 
temporary regulations should continue to 
be invalidated. However, when they have 
been finalized after completion of 
notice-and-comment, the regulations 
should be upheld, particularly if applied 
only prospectively. taxpayers who already 
have won their cases should be safe, but 
taxpayers whose cases have not yet been 
decided will be in jeopardy. n
